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Licensing Trusts 
in new Zealand
Bernard Teahan
Licensing trusts in New Zealand are a statutory form of 
community enterprise now existing for over 70 years. Thirty 
were established between 1944 and 1975. Over the years 
since they have generated wealth of $250 million through 
their business units, benefited their areas in many ways, and 
through their community support donations programmes1 
distributed significant profit back to enhance their 
community’s quality of life. Today, 18 continue to operate 
(mainly hospitality) businesses, and provide support to their 
communities. 
•	 What	are	the	‘mystical’	elements	
endearing community enterprises to 
their communities?
•	 Who	are	the	owners	of	a	licensing	
trust?
•	 How	have	they	performed	in	meeting	
their statutory objectives?
This article reviews some of the answers 
A Great Social Experiment yields, with 
emphasis on the lessons they provide for 
the growing global world of social and 
community enterprises. 
History: a better way
The sale of liquor in New Zealand has 
long been controversial, as it has in many 
countries. In the 1940s, the liquor laws 
were widely accepted to be a mess.3 It was 
a time of war, and an uncertain climate 
for social change. New Zealand was still a 
young country, barely a generation away 
from its pioneering days, when the excesses 
of alcohol brought about prohibition in 
many areas.
The concept of licensing trusts was 
born out of a desire to create something 
better but not to give rein to the excesses 
of the past. The parliamentary debates 
record that it was based on a liquor control 
scheme originating in Carlisle on the 
Scottish/English border. But it is most 
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Their presence, successes and failures 
offer insights into this form of statutory 
enterprise and also the wider sphere 
of enterprise controlled by defined 
communities and accountable to them. Yet 
licensing trusts are relatively unknown in 
their entirety. To redress this and to confront 
misconceptions, in July 2017 A Great Social 
Experiment (Teahan, 2017) 2 was published. 
Key policy conundrums concerning their 
existence and performance are debated in 
the book:
•	 What	is	the	justification	for	their	
existence today?
•	 In	today’s	more	fluid	communities,	
how could the 50–70-year-old, 
street-by-street definitions of trust 
communities be relevant?
•	 What	is	the	role	of	community	
enterprises in a global world?
•	 Are	democratically	elected	boards	too	
hit and miss in delivering the 
necessary talents to govern a 
competitive enterprise?
•	 Is	it	unwise	to	mix	social/community	
goals with economic goals under one 
management?
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design of a remarkable man, the minister 
of	 justice,	H.G.R.	Mason.4	He	sought	 to	
establish	‘a	body	corporate	for	the	purpose	
of providing for the establishment of 
model hotels … in the interests of the 
public well-being, and of providing for the 
sale of intoxicating liquor in the district, 
and to provide for the distribution of the 
profits	 for	 public	 purposes’	 (Hansard,	
1944, p.716). The then prime minister, 
Peter Fraser, with his socialist beliefs5 and 
his keen sense of community, was also a 
noted supporter.
The	 Invercargill	 Licensing	 Trust	Act	
1944	was	 passed	 on	 17	April	 1944.	The	
Masterton	Licensing	Trust	Act	followed	in	
December 1947 and the Licensing Trusts 
Act	in	1949.	Over	the	years	those	acts	have	
been merged into the sale of liquor 
legislation.
Structure and governance
The 30 licensing trusts were formed 
between 1944 and 1975. Thus, no trust has 
been	established	for	over	40	years.	While	
that in part suggests that the circumstances 
giving rise to trusts no longer exist, it should 
be remembered that the 1980s through 
to the late 1990s or early 2000s was very 
much a time when the market philosophy 
and private enterprise dominated. The 
charitable trusts legislation too is an easier 
structure through which to establish a 
community	enterprise.	A	further	influence	
was the business and government climate 
during	 the	earlier	decades.	As	Bollinger	
(1967) and others caustically record, often 
the business and political climate had not 
been supportive for licensing trusts, even 
though trusts had been enthusiastically 
supported by their communities.
To form a licensing trust was never 
easy. First, the community had to decide 
whether it wished to do so, in a public 
poll. The alternative choice was private 
enterprise.6	 A	 constitution	 notice	 was	
then	promulgated	through	the	Ministry	
of Justice. Elections were called for 
(generally six) trustees to represent the 
community. Once elected, the hard work 
began. The trustees had to find a property, 
engage builders, and, most difficult of all, 
find the necessary finance. Invariably, 
trusts started out with over 100% debt 
financing, which was always a significant 
hurdle to overcome. They then had to 
efficiently operate a licensed premises, 
with all its associated problems and 
challenges. 
Financing a start-up licensing trust 
was a problem that collectively the trusts 
never really solved. The more supportive 
Labour government had guaranteed bank 
overdrafts and advanced funds from the 
Consolidated Fund for the Invercargill 
and	 Masterton	 trusts	 during	 their	
establishment stage, and both trusts 
quickly repaid that support with a speed 
of providing new premises and achieving 
profitability that removed the need for 
the guarantee. But from the 1950s 
onwards government support was very 
limited, predominantly restricted to 
guaranteeing the last 25% of any 
overdraft funding.
As	a	body	corporate,	the	trust	was	vested	
with the necessary powers to operate a 
business. It was required to pay taxes, and 
be audited by the controller and auditor-
general. Its meetings are subject to the Local 
Government	 Official	 Information	 and	
Meetings	Act	1987	and	an	annual	public	
meeting must be held where its annual 
accounts and report are open to scrutiny. 
Performance over the years
To gain a perspective of the performance 
of licensing trusts over the 70 plus years of 
their existence, and their value as a form 
of community enterprise, a number of 
benchmarks are desirable:
•	 their	collective	financial	performance;
•	 their	individual	range	of	
performance;
•	 their	success	or	failure	in	delivering	
benefits	to	their	communities;
•	 their	comparative	performance	
relative to alternative forms of 
ownership,	notably	private	enterprise;
•	 their	demise	rate	and	why	some	have	
failed to continue to exist, primarily 
to assess whether there are generic 
causes relative to their structure.
Reason for being
A	 logical	 starting	 point	 justifying	 the	
existence of licensing trusts is the objectives 
they were given, first in the legislation of 
the 1940s, and today in the Sale and Supply 
of	Alcohol	Act	2012,	the	current	legislation	
for licensing trusts.
The well-being of their communities, 
particularly in the sale and provision of 
sensitive products, is the initial unique 
distinguishing feature. Caring for their 
communities to the extent that profit was 
not pursued at the expense of people’s 
welfare was a prime motivator in their 
formation.	Mason	described	 it	 this	way:	
‘although	the	Board	should	be	primarily	a	
commercial body, we should like to see the 
element of social welfare developed to the 
fullest extent … so that it should 
predominate strongly in all the operations 
of the trust, as well as in the distribution of 
money’	 (Hansard,	 1944,	 p.719).	 In	 the	
current legislation, as with the Licensing 
Trusts	Act	1949,	there	is	no	overt	mention	
of this well-being factor, but take away this 
accountability to their local community 
and there is little meaning to licensing 
trusts’ existence that could not be achieved 
by private ownership. They are required to 
report back to the electors of their defined 
district in a number of ways, none 
(arguably) more influential than the 
triennial elections to decide which trustees 
should represent the community.
The second unique reason for existence 
is the distribution of profits back to 
community organisations in support of 
community activities. Today this function 
is one of the major areas of activity for 
trusts, and one which, not surprisingly, 
endears them to their community. But first 
trusts must make profits. They need to be 
Caring for their communities to the extent 
that profit was not pursued at the expense 
of people’s welfare was a prime motivator 
in the [Licensing Trust] formation. 
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efficient and commercially sound or they 
will not survive. 
The various acts of Parliament over the 
years have defined the objectives of trusts 
as being to provide licensed premises for 
the sale of alcohol, and the provision of 
meals and accommodation. That business 
segment, frequently and loosely called the 
hospitality sector, has been where licensing 
trusts’ commercial activities have been 
predominantly	 concentrated.	What	 has	
resulted have frequently been attractive 
and significant hotels, taverns, restaurants 
and	bottle	stores;	so	much	so	that	in	some	
communities the licensing trust facilities 
have been the catalyst for the generation of 
new economic activity, notably tourism, 
providing sustained employment. 
Examples are the hotels in Invercargill 
(Ascot	Park	Hotel	is	a	modern	facility	with	
116 accommodation rooms, bars, a 
restaurant and conference facilities), 
Solway	 Park	 Hotel	 in	 Masterton	 (102	
rooms)	and	Waipuna	Hotel	(148	rooms)	
in	Mount	Wellington,	Auckland.	Not	all	of	
the over 130 trust facilities are of this 
standard, with some trusts providing more 
modest social premises of bars, bottle 
stores and gaming lounges. Some trusts 
have	used	the	‘catch	all’	objectives	clause	in	
the legislation7 to broaden their trading 
base into other sectors: for example, aged 
care, supermarkets, housing, and property 
as landlords. 
Philosophical underpinning
Inherent in the structure of licensing trusts 
are the concepts of a love of community, 
a sense of self, solidarity and enterprise,8 
which collectively are the driving forces 
behind community enterprises seeking 
to enhance the well-being of their 
community. It is these components 
that endear community enterprises like 
licensing trusts to their communities, 
and why they have endured. Throughout 
its history since the signing of the Treaty 
of	Waitangi,	New	Zealand	has	had	a	love	
affair with the concept. In the nature of 
love affairs, at times the relationship has 
been	close;	at	others,	distant.	The	renewed	
international and national interest9 in 
community enterprises of recent times 
once again emphasises their need in a 
more globally driven world, in which 
communities seek to protect their interests 
and enhance their quality of life. Simply 
put, community enterprises, and their 
sister organisations, social enterprises, are 
primarily concerned with the well-being of 
their defined community.   
How,	 then,	 have	 licensing	 trusts	
performed in carrying out this mandate, 
and what is their collective size and range?
Alcohol care performance
In the writer’s experience, this subject is, at 
best,	one	of	those	‘deep-grained’	elements	
embedded in trusts’ fabric. The elected 
nature of trusts’ governance invariably 
demands a supportive and timely response 
to community pressure.
Arguably,	 the	 design	 and	 quality	 of	
licensed premises has been a major 
influence	on	the	use	of	alcohol	in	licensing	
trust communities. Just as the Carlisle 
scheme designer’s sensitive knowledge of 
social needs led to improvements in social 
habits, many licensing trusts have led 
their communities. That this has been a 
force in trusts’ behaviour should not be 
too surprising. It is human nature for 
trustees to want the best for their 
communities, because, at the least, that 
also	reflects	well	on	them.	But	this	trait	
has also brought about trusts’ failures, 
where the product or premises was not 
supported by the market, as in the failures 
of	the	Orewa,	Hornby	and	Stokes	Valley	
licensing trusts.
There are no objective statistics that 
‘prove’	licensing	trusts	have	more	caringly	
managed the sale of alcohol in their 
communities than private enterprise has. 
Crime, alcohol-related incidents, 
drunkenness, social excesses, all are 
influenced by too many variables – 
unemployment, poverty, education 
standards, the relative wealth of the 
community, among some – to provide 
meaningful	answers.	What	are	available	are	
stories,	often	influenced	by	the	opinions	
and mindset of the teller, but nonetheless 
‘real’	in	the	sense	that	they	are	contestable.	
In their submissions on the Law 
Commission review in 2009 of alcohol law 
in New Zealand, the New Zealand Licensing 
Trusts	Association	recorded	a	number	of	
examples (see New Zealand Licensing 
Trusts	Association,	2009).	
Assets and financial performance
Table 1 summarises key financial indicators 
from trusts’ annual accounts.
These results collectively provide 
evidence of good returns and sound equity. 
Annual	returns	on	equity	of	around	18%	
demonstrate good management, and yearly 
donations approximating $30 million are 
noteworthy.
Community support donations
This function has grown considerably over 
the last 20 years, to where today the funds 
donated to the community in support 
of a very wide range of organisations 
and activities significantly enhance the 
quality of community life. The growth has 
come partly as trusts have matured, and 
substantially as they moved to provide 
gaming lounges when legislation in New 
Zealand	 authorised	‘pokie	machines’	 in	
licensed	premises.	Gaming,	like	alcohol,	is	
a	‘sensitive’	product	requiring	management	
with care, and the trusts were well placed to 
even-handedly balance availability with the 
tendency to excess for some people.
Some of the larger trust donations – for 
example,	Invercargill,	Waitäkere, Portage 
and	Masterton	–	have	been	very	sizeable,	
frequently hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, and sometimes in the millions. The 
Invercargill Trust’s support and facilitation 
of Stadium Southland, with its indoor 
Table 1: Licensing trusts’ financial indicators
1990 2008 2014*
Annual revenue $286.633m $356.852m $349.787m
Assets employed $224.785m $313.053m $342.802m
Equity $151.215m $231.813m $245.828m
Community support donations $2.162m $33.444m $26.930m
Equity ratio 66.6% 74.05% 71.70%
Profit $2.280m $41.687m $45.977m
Return on equity 1.56% 17.98% 18.70%
* These three years are the occasions when collective studies were undertaken. 
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cycle track of international standard, is but 
one example of an exceptional facility that 
would be unlikely, arguably, to exist 
without the trust’s efforts. Other examples 
are	Henley	Lake	in	Masterton,	the	Portage	
and	 Waitäkere	 trusts’	 Trusts	 Arena	 in	
Henderson,	and	Lake	Hood	in	Ashburton.	
A Great Social Experiment estimates that 
the total of these cash donations over 70 
plus years exceeds $500 million. To that 
may	be	added	another	sizable	sum	of	‘in	
kind’ support, such as no charge for use of 
facilities, and sponsorship greater than 
commercially justified.
However,	 it	 is	 the	 many	 small	
donations, of a few hundred or thousand 
dollars, that are the lifeblood of many trust 
communities. It is these that consistently 
endear	 trusts	 to	 their	 communities.	An	
example of this activity is listed in the Trust 
House10 annual reports (Table 2).
Why trusts have demised
There is a theme expressed from time to 
time by the critics of licensing trusts that 
they are an impractical ideal incapable of 
reasonable performance.11	After	 all,	 say	
the critics, if you are going to operate a 
business, the private ownership model 
is widely understood, has clear lines of 
ownership and commitment, and has been 
proven to be the structure to best deliver 
the most efficient business performance. 
All	that	is	true	at	least	in	the	sense	of	widely	
accepted business beliefs. But as we come 
to the end of three decades during which 
the market philosophy and neo-liberalism 
dominated, we have learnt again that other 
structures provide opportunities to pursue 
a range of objectives wider than profit 
generation.	For,	as	Jensen	and	Meckling	
record	in	their	seminal	essay	‘The	nature	
of	man’,	we	‘care	about	not	only	money,	but	
about almost everything – respect, honor, 
power, love, and the welfare of others’ 
(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1994).
There is another challenge here that, in 
the harsh limelight of the media, licensing 
trusts have not addressed well, or been 
allowed to address criticism: 
In reality, trusts became unpopular 
with most New Zealanders because 
they succumbed to the normal 
stultifying consequences of smallness 
and monopoly. Their return on 
investment was poor, their 
accountability weak and their service 
to consumers dismal, the trusts 
serving up booze barns, slack service 
and inferior financial management ... 
The vast majority of New Zealanders 
long ago saw through the warm 
fuzzies that underpin the trust 
concept (New Zealand Herald, 2003)
When	opinions	such	as	this	are	aired,	
arguably the record should be balanced. In 
the	West	Auckland	circumstance	referred	
to here, the community by their votes 
overwhelmingly rejected the editorial’s 
views, but such comment has a way of 
lingering, and even being accepted as the 
prevailing truth, if not consistently refuted. 
Even in recent times a request to the editor 
to redress significant errors in a Dominion 
Post article drew no response (Du Fresne, 
2017). 
The common causes of business failure 
– misreading the size of the market, 
inadequate management and governance 
skills, overinvestment, lack of equity – are 
just as relevant for trusts. The lack of equity 
capital was especially debilitating, and 
frequently required trusts to borrow all their 
capital and their start-up costs. Profits then 
had	 to	 be	 generated	 immediately.	When	
start-up problems occurred, at times 
exacerbated by the inexperience of the 
trustees in running a tavern or hotel, 
sometimes it was little short of a miracle the 
trust survived. Often, the volunteer effort by 
trustees was remarkable.12 
The	failure	of	the	Stokes	Valley	trust	
within a few months of opening its doors 
for trading was to cast a long shadow over 
the licensing trust concept for decades to 
come. To fail within such a short period of 
time inevitably fuelled the view of some 
that	 trusts	 were	 inherently	 flawed.	 The	
critics	had	a	field	day	with	their	‘told	you	
so’ wisdom. The reality evidenced by 
archived correspondence and reports,13 
and hindsight, shows that there were a 
number	of	contributing	factors.	The	flaws	
of the licensing trust model, notably the 
lack of equity capital, did contribute, but 
the conflicting requirements of the 
regulating agencies were far more 
destructive. The Licensing Control 
Commission required accommodation (16 
rooms) to be provided for the travelling 
public to address their concern about the 
shortage	 within	 the	 wider	 Wellington	
region;	and	the	Lower	Hutt	City	Council	
opposed the location of the premises on 
the one site at the entrance to the Stokes 
Valley	where	there	was	a	(limited)	chance	
of a reasonable market from the travelling 
public.	 From	 this	 conflict,	 the	 worse	
outcome resulted: an overcapitalised hotel 
located	in	the	middle	of	the	Valley	catering	
to the largely incompatible markets of the 
residents and the visitor. Failure was thus 
inevitable.
Less defensible was the failure of the 
four	Wellington	trusts	 in	 the	 late	1990s.	
Major	 shortcomings	 in	 governance	 and	
management were the significant factors. 
The	 ‘failure’14 rate of trusts can be 
reasonably compared to the similar rate 
for	private	enterprise	companies.	While	
one-off failures or a small number 
comparison need to be viewed with 
caution, the 70-year period of licensing 
trust existence gives more credibility. The 
more credible statistics suggest about 25% 
of new businesses do not survive the first 
year, 50% do not survive five years and 
71% ten years. That, after an average 
existence of 45 years for the 30 trusts, the 
demise rate for licensing trusts of 40% is 
remarkably good.
Footprint today
The 18 licensing trusts existing today 
are an integrated and integral part of 
their communities. They range from the 
largest, Invercargill, with assets exceeding 
$100 million, annual revenues exceeding 
$90 million and community support 
donations of over $100 million since 
2007,	to	the	smallest,	Hawarden,	which	has	
recently closed the only tavern servicing 
Table 2: Trust House donations
2012 2011
Amount of donations  $2.754 million $2.886 million
Number of donations 322 349
Total donations last 10 years (2003–12) $31.537 million $31.150 million
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its very small community of 250 for 45 
years.	 Five	 –	 Wiri,	 Mount	Wellington,	
Birkenhead,	Portage	and	Waitäkere – are in 
metropolitan	Auckland;	four	–	Invercargill,	
Porirua,	Rimutaka,	Flaxmere	–	 in	cities;	
and	 nine	 –	Mataura,	 Clutha,	 ŌOamaru,	
Geraldine,	Ashburton,	Hawarden,	Cheviot,	
Masterton	and	Te	Kauwhata	–	in	provincial	
New Zealand.
Weaknesses, challenges and the future
The community assets generated are 
now quite significant. In most cases they 
provide both a springboard to the future 
and insulation against the lows of business 
cycles. But there are warning signals for 
licensing trusts: the hospitality industry is 
often over-supplied, with frequently low 
profitability and returns, and subject to a 
number of societal threats. Some traditional 
segments for trusts – for example, bars and 
bottle stores – may have a limited future for 
the trusts without the restrictive mandates. 
Some of the smaller trusts, which have but 
one outlet providing a bar for their residents, 
are providing services for a market that time 
has largely passed by.
Supermarket sales of wine and beer at 
low margins dominate the take-home 
liquor	 sales	 market.	 What	 is	 left	 is	
increasingly captured by a proliferation of 
traders who operate corner stores in a way 
similar to the traditional corner diary. 
Trusts are not able to compete easily with 
this business model of family living on the 
premises, long hours for low pay and 
internal	 ‘family’	 financing.	 Further,	 the	
tendency for these operations to 
complement their liquor business with the 
sale of recreational drugs – commonly 
called party pills – further accelerates the 
demise of this market for trusts, who see 
these sales as abhorrent and detrimental to 
the well-being of their community. 
A	further	challenge	for	trusts	is	their	
ability to obtain or retain the level of 
management and governance skills 
necessary to make the changes required to 
remain relevant in the future. Some smaller 
trusts have met that need by association 
with a larger licensing trust nearby: for 
example, the shared resources of Portage 
and	Waitäkere	in	West	Auckland,	and	the	
management	 grouping	 of	 Masterton,	
Flaxmere	and	Rimutaka	existing	prior	to	
2015 for nearly 30 years. 
Four trusts continue to maintain 
limited monopoly rights within their 
constituted	area:	Portage,	Waitäkere,	Mataura	
and Invercargill. So long as these rights 
continue to exist, supermarkets can not sell 
beer and wine, and private operators can not 
own and operate taverns in these areas. Only 
the community can vote to remove these 
rights. Invariably, any such poll is funded and 
organised by the supermarket chains wanting 
to access the benefits of beer and wine sales.15 
While	these	monopoly	rights	remain,	these	
four trusts have an appreciable degree of 
protection and are less buffeted by market 
forces. Their ability to influence their 
communities beneficially in the use of 
alcohol and gaming is also significantly 
greater.16
Societal changes too are having an 
impact on licensing trusts, at times 
beneficially. Communities are concerned 
about the abuse of alcohol and are 
imposing restrictions. It is unlikely that 
these constraints, which also reinforce the 
original ideals of licensing trusts, have 
peaked.
A	few	trusts	have	broadened	both	their	
geographic and trading segment base. 
Masterton	is	the	notable	example,	owning	
businesses away from its home area and 
hospitality.	 Aged	 care	 (since	 exited),	
supermarkets (also since exited), residential 
housing and a small hydro electricity 
scheme are examples of its diversification.
What we can learn from licensing trusts’ 
experience
Although	only	 a	 niche	 of	New	Zealand	
society, licensing trusts’ presence in rural, 
provincial and metropolitan areas, and 
their existence for over 70 years, give 
important lessons for today’s more globally 
interdependent world:
•	 Community	(and	social)	enterprises	
provide an important balance to 
globalisation. Communities can thus 
better ensure essential services are 
available;	sensitive	products	are	
managed	in	their	best	interests;	the	
poor, disadvantaged or other subsets of 
their	community	are	supported;	
employment or economic development 
is	pursued;	or	the	community	is	
protected from a monopoly position.
•	 Community	well-being	goals	and	
business goals can be successfully 
achieved in concert provided they are 
clearly established and regularly 
reviewed.
•	 There	is	no	substitute	for	good,	
committed people governing and 
managing. If the necessary skills are not 
available (through the ballot box in 
licensing trusts’ case), they must be 
brought in. Ideals must be tempered 
with reality.
•	 Accountability	to	their	owners,	the	
community, is essential if the extremes 
of poor performance and excesses are to 
be avoided.
•	 The	‘dividend’	of	surplus	profits	
generated from the business units can 
be deployed to enhance the 
community’s quality of life. Donations 
to support cultural, artistic, recreational, 
educational and sporting organisations 
can in turn allow these groups to better 
function.
Conclusion
Alcohol	 sales	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
community’s well-being were both the 
reason and the vehicle for the establishment 
of licensing trusts. Today, that remains the 
dominant trading base for them, with 
gaming added as the second sensitive 
product. 
A further challenge for trusts is their 
ability to obtain or retain the level of 
management and governance skills 
necessary to make the changes required 
to remain relevant in the future. 
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For the 18 trusts remaining, the future 
is	 diverse.	A	 few	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	
evolve out of their, mostly small, hospitality 
trading base and their future in their 
present form is challenging. Others are 
determinedly changing to ensure their 
relevance for the decades ahead, while 
successfully providing appreciated 
community services.
Collectively, licensing trusts have 
contributed much to their communities, 
and while there have been less than 
laudable stories and failures, their 
architects,	H.G.R.	Mason	and	Peter	Fraser,	
were they alive, could be forgiven if they 
took some quiet pleasure in their successes. 
That they have survived for 70 years and 
achieved the collective size and support for 
their communities they have is a notable 
legacy.
1 These extensive lists of donations are recorded in their 
annual reports and on their websites.
2 The book’s title derives from the 1944 parliamentary 
debates. The author sees the words as a question for the 
reader to decide.
3 For example, see Bollinger (1967) and the many references 
during the parliamentary debates on licensing trusts in the 
1940s.
4 Rex Mason was minister of justice (as well as holding a 
number of other portfolios) from 1935 to 1949 and 1957 to 
1960. He is now regarded as making ‘possibly the greatest 
contribution of any politician to law reform in New Zealand 
in the twentieth century’ (Round, 2011). Among his many 
reforms, he reorganised and modernised New Zealand law 
in the major Law Reform Act 1936, established the Law 
Reform Commission of 1937, and, through his persistent 
efforts over many years, decimal currency in 1967.
5 See Bassett and King, 2000.
6 Remarkably, and overwhelmingly in the polls, communities 
chose licensing trusts in 57 areas. By comparison, there 
were nine areas where private enterprise was chosen ahead 
of a community licensing trust. Often the mandate was well 
over 90%.
7 The Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012 provides (section 
305) that a trust may also ‘carry on any other business that, 
in the Trust’s opinion, can be conveniently carried on in 
conjunction’ with their hospitality functions.
8 This article does not intend to discuss how these concepts 
interweave to underpin community enterprises. For more on 
this, see Teahan, 2007.
9 For example, see Laville, 2003; Salamon, 2003; Bollier, 
2002; OECD, 1999; Department of Trade and Industry (UK), 
2002. Teahan (2007) explores why this growth is occurring.
10 Trust House Limited is the operating company for the 
Masterton Licensing Trust; it also provides some services for 
the Flaxmere and Rimutaka trusts, and more recently the 
Porirua Community Trust.
11 For example, at the time that four Wellington licensing trusts 
failed in the late 1990s there was considerable editorial 
agitation in the local newspapers. Also, in 2003, at the 
time of the West Auckland competition polls (see Teahan, 
2007, chapter 6), editorials were often bitterly opposed to 
the trusts; when the trusts comfortably won with significant 
support from the community these unbalanced comments 
became an ironic epitaph.
12 As recorded, for example, in an unpublished account of the 
first 25 years of the Flaxmere Licensing Trust.
13 The files of the Ministry of Justice at Archives New Zealand 
are a rich source of information.
14 Demise is a better term than failure. As for private enterprise 
companies, cessation will often be voluntary: for example, 
because time has passed the market opportunity by, or there 
is no longer a wish to continue. 
15 Originally, 13 trusts had limited monopoly rights. In all, with 
some multiple challenges, there have been 16 polls, with six 
favouring retention of the monopoly rights for the trust, and 
ten favouring open competition. Only in Invercargill has no 
poll ever been called. These polls have complex influences: 
see Teahan, 2007 and 2017.
16 An example arose during research into the West Auckland 
polls in 2003: the number of gaming machines in Portage 
and Waitäkere was one third the occurrence in the rest of 
New Zealand.
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